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NOTE
It’s Probable: Missouri Constitution Article
I, Section 15 Requires a Higher Standard to
Obtain a Warrant for Real-Time or
Prospective CSLI
Aaron Hadlow

*

I. INTRODUCTION
There are more active cell phones in the United States than there are
people.1 Law enforcement officers often use electronic communication data
during criminal investigations to surveil suspects.2 Law enforcement officers
*

B.A., Philosophy, Missouri State University, 2011; J.D. Candidate, University of
Missouri School of Law, 2018. I would like to extend my gratitude to Professor
Bowman, whose early guidance and valuable ongoing feedback as faculty advisor
steered this Note in a more favorable direction; the editorial board members of the
Missouri Law Review, who I am humbled to associate with as colleagues, and whose
suggestions unquestionably improved this Note in ways I could not on my own. I
extend particular thanks to Bradley Craigmyle, Ben Levin, Jack Downing, Tom
Wright, Emily Mace, and the many Law Review members whose labors in footnote
checking are greatly appreciated. I thank my family for their continued support, especially my wife Rebekah, whose love is given without hesitation and whose confidence I share in every endeavor.
1. According to an annual survey conducted by the CTIA, an organization representing the wireless communications industry, wireless subscribers equaled 115.7%
of the U.S. population.
Annual Wireless Industry Survey, CTIA,
http://www.ctia.org/your-wireless-life/how-wireless-works/annual-wireless-industrysurvey (last updated Oct. 2016) [hereinafter CTIA Survey]. In December 2015, there
were an estimated 377.9 million wireless subscriber connections. Id.
2. In 2015, the U.S. district courts in Missouri authorized fifty-six wiretap applications, primarily for monitoring the content of electronic communication data on
cell phones. OFFICE OF ADMIN., WIRETAP REPORT 2015 tbl.2 (Dec. 31, 2015),
http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/wiretap_2_1231.2015.pdf
[hereinafter WIRETAP REPORT 2015]. These applications, however, only incorporate
those applications by law enforcement made under the Wire and Electronic Communications Interception and Interception of Oral Communications Statute. Id.; 18
U.S.C. §§ 2510–2522 (2012). They do not incorporate applications for CSLI under
The Stored Communication Act. Id. §§ 2703–2712. Applications granted under §
2703 are included in a separate report for delayed-notice search warrants. Id. § 2703.
Data reported for § 2703 applications are only available through 2014, when the U.S.
district courts in Missouri authorized 191 delay-notice search warrants. OFFICE OF
ADMIN., DELAYED-NOTICE SEARCH WARRANT REPORT 2014 tbl.2 (Dec. 31, 2014),
http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/table_2_0.pdf.
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are able to do so because cell phone ownership is nearly universal.3 Cell
phones emit signals to the nearest cell phone tower every seven seconds.4
Once the signal is received by the cell tower, it is recorded in signal logs,
which are stored by cell service providers.5 This information is called “cellsite location information” (“CSLI”).6 Under federal statute, law enforcement
may access these records as both historic data and as real-time CSLI.7 Historic CSLI is a record retained by the cell service provider of the cell phone’s
signal transmissions to cell towers.8 Real-time CSLI is the data “stream[ed]
continuously” by a cell phone to a cell tower.9 In most cases, an authorized
governmental authority can access this information without knowledge of the
phone’s user.10
The scope of this Note primarily deals with issues surrounding real-time
CSLI, although the issues implicated by article I, section 15 of the Missouri
Constitution could apply to historic CSLI as well. Part II of this Note discusses general principles of Fourth Amendment law and the Supreme Court’s
treatment of searches and seizures in relation to electronic communications
and data. It then discusses the statutory developments empowering law enforcement to use emerging technologies for surveillance purposes. Part III
discusses recent developments in search and seizure law. It then discusses
Missouri’s recent amendment to its constitution, which provides additional
protections for electronic communications and data. Part IV discusses the
impact of recent legal developments on CSLI and law enforcement practice.

3. There are an estimated 8.1 billion devices connected wirelessly worldwide.
See Over 8 Billion Connected Devices Globally, IHS Says, IHS MARKIT (June 10,
2016, 6:40 AM), http://news.ihsmarkit.com/press-release/technology/over-8-billionconnected-devices-globally-ihs-says. On average, there are four wireless devices per
household across the globe. See id.
4. Alison Healey, Answering the Call: The Latest News on Tracking Individuals
via Their Cellular Phones, FED. L. ENFORCEMENT TRAINING CTRS. 1,
https://www.fletc.gov/sites/default/files/imported_files/training/programs/legaldivision/downloads-articles-and-faqs/research-bysubject/miscellaneous/TrackingIndividualsviaTheirCellularPhones.pdf (last visited
Mar. 26, 2017). There are more than 307,000 cell tower sites located in the United
States. CTIA Survey, supra note 1.
5. Healey, supra note 4.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. 1 JAMES G. CARR, PATRICIA L. BELLIA & EVAN A. CREUTZ, LAW OF
ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE § 4:88 (Aug. 2016).
9. Id. Some courts have held that only five minutes need to pass to change realtime CSLI to historic. See State v. Perry, 776 S.E.2d 528, 535 (N.C. Ct. App. 2015).
10. Under 18 U.S.C. § 2703, a delayed-notice warrant is often issued. Delaynoticed periods may be extended in practice indefinitely. 18 U.S.C. § 2705 (2012).
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II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Part II is broken into three parts. Part A reviews the general principles
of Fourth Amendment law. Part B discusses the Supreme Court’s development of surveillance law under the Fourth Amendment. Part C sketches the
development of the modern surveillance statutory scheme under which Missouri law enforcement operates.

A. Fourth Amendment General Principles
The Fourth Amendment has two clauses. The first clause (the search
and seizure clause) reads: “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated . . . .”11 The second clause (the warrants clause) reads:
“and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”12 A seizure is “some meaningful interference

11. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
12. Id. (emphasis added). James Madison’s originally proposed amendment

during the 1787 Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia seemed to intend that these
two provisions be conjunctive, so that a reasonable search and seizure was necessarily
conditioned upon the fulfillment of hard warrant requirements. 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE,
SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 1.1(a) (5th ed.
2016). Madison’s proposal read:
The rights of the people to be secured in their persons, their houses, their papers, and their other property, from all unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated by warrants issued without probable cause, supported by
oath or affirmation, or not particularly describing the places to be searched, or
the persons or things to be seized.

Id. (quoting 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 452 (1789)). Madison’s inclusion of the phrase
“shall not be violated by warrants issued without” would appear to authorize all “unreasonable searches” if accompanied by any warrant, regardless of whether it was
issued with probable cause, or the other warrant requirements. This was surely the
opposite of what Madison intended. A more logical reading of Madison’s proposal
given the historical context is that Madison intended hard warrant requirements for all
searches and seizures. These hard warrant requirements were even maintained
through committee alterations. Id. However, the committee chairman reported the
eventually adopted Fourth Amendment language, despite a majority of the committee
voting against it, which includes the above-emphasized “and No warrants” language,
which has been interpreted as separating the unreasonable search and seizure provision from the warrant requirement provision. Id. The “and No warrants” wording
was included, over Constitutional Convention committee objection, to clarify the
more dangerous ambiguity that existed on the face of Madison’s original proposal.
Id.
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with an individual’s possessory interests in that property.”13 A search within
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment has never been explicitly defined by
the Supreme Court of the United States.14 However, law enforcement’s access of CSLI has for many years been treated as a search.15 Prior to 1967, the
Supreme Court generally held that, in order for a search to occur, within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment, there had to be some physical intrusion
into a “constitutionally protected area.”16 Constitutionally protected areas
were limited to those enumerated in the text of the Fourth Amendment.17
This was known as the trespassory doctrine.18 In 1967, the Supreme Court
turned away from this approach in Katz v. United States.19
In Katz, Charles Katz was convicted of transmitting wagering information by telephone across state lines in violation of federal gambling laws.20
During trial, recordings of Katz’s phone conversations were admitted into
evidence.21 The evidence was obtained after FBI agents had attached an
“electronic listening and recording device” to the outside of the public telephone booth that Katz used to place the incriminating phone calls.22 The
Supreme Court was called on to determine whether the evidence was obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment and therefore erroneously ad13. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984). Black’s defines a seizure as “[t]he act or an instance of taking possession of a person or property by legal
right or process.” Seizure, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
14. 1 LAFAVE, supra note 12, § 2.1(a) (“The Supreme Court, quite understandably, has never managed to set out a comprehensive definition of the word ‘searches’
as it is used in the Fourth Amendment.”). LaFave offers a traditional definition that
has been used by several appellate courts. “Search” is said to imply:
some exploratory investigation, or an invasion and quest, a looking for or
seeking out. The quest may be secret, intrusive, or accomplished by force,
and it has been held that a search implies some sort of force, either actual or
constructive, much or little. A search implies a prying into hidden places for
that which is concealed and that the object searched for has been hidden or intentionally put out of the way. While it has been said that ordinarily searching
is a function of sight, it is generally held that the mere looking at that which is
open to view is not a “search.”

Id. § 2.1 (quoting 79 C.J.S. Searches and Seizures § 1 (1952)).
15. See United States v. Graham, 796 F.3d 332, 344 (4th Cir. 2015), adhered to
in part on reh’g en banc, 824 F.3d 421 (4th Cir. 2016).
16. Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 512 (1961).
17. These enumerations included “‘persons,’ including the bodies and clothing of
individuals; ‘houses,’ including apartments, hotel rooms, garages, business offices,
stores, and warehouse; ‘papers,’ such as letters; and ‘effects,’ such as automobiles.” 1
LAFAVE, supra note 12, § 2.1(a) (footnotes omitted).
18. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949 (2012).
19. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
20. Id. at 348.
21. Id.
22. Id.
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mitted into evidence.23 The Court dismissed the State’s argument that the
search was permissible under the Fourth Amendment because there was no
physical trespass.24 Instead, the Court ruled that “the Fourth Amendment
protects people, not places.”25
In Katz, Justice Harlan articulated in a concurrence the two-part test
now known as the Katz test: “[F]irst[,] that a person have exhibited an actual
(subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one
that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”26 The Katz ruling required law enforcement to obtain a warrant under the probable cause standard
in order to conduct similar surveillance activities in the future.27
While Katz was a turning point in Fourth Amendment search doctrine,
Supreme Court case law relating to the warrant clause of the Fourth Amendment has followed its own line of development. Given the practical realities
of the work of law enforcement, a number of exceptions to the warrant requirement have been carved out over the years.28 However, courts always
prefer that police officers obtain a warrant before a search.29 Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 41, which most surveillance statutes refer to for warrant
requirements, generally tracks the language of the Fourth Amendment, requiring the warrant to (1) describe the identity of the person or property to be
searched or seized, (2) be issued by a magistrate judge or a judge of a state
court of record, and (3) be served within a specified time period no longer
than fourteen days after issuance.30
If some governmental act is deemed a search within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment, then regardless of whether it falls under an exception to
the warrant requirement, it must be supported by probable cause.31 Probable
cause has its own definitional difficulties.32 Generally, probable cause evaluations use a multi-factor, objective test: “[W]ould the facts available to the
officer at the moment of the seizure or the search ‘warrant a man of reasona-

23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Id. at 349–50.
Id. at 353.
Id. at 351.
Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
Id. at 358–59 (majority opinion).
For information regarding exigent circumstances, see Michigan v. Fisher,
558 U.S. 45, 47 (2009) (emergency aid); Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 460 (2011)
(imminent destruction of evidence); United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 42–43
(1976) (hot pursuit); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925) (border
searches); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762–63 (1969) (protective searches).
29. 2 LAFAVE, supra note 12, § 4.1(a).
30. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(e).
31. 2 LAFAVE, supra note 12, § 3.1(a).
32. Id. § 3.2(a). The Supreme Court held in Illinois v. Gates that “probable
cause is a fluid concept − turning on the assessment of probabilities in particular factual contexts − not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules.”
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983).
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ble caution in the belief’ that the action taken was appropriate.”33 Determining whether sufficient evidence exists to support probable cause depends on a
balancing test, weighing the invasiveness of the privacy interest against the
nature of the immediacy at hand.34

B. Historic Surveillance Law Cases
As demonstrated in Katz, warrant and probable cause requirements in
surveillance cases can raise interesting questions when criminals try to outpace law enforcement in the utilization of new technology.
The next major35 development in surveillance law came in two beeper
cases decided a year apart.36 In United States v. Knotts, a beeper was hidden
in a vat of chloroform that was used to locate a 3M employee who had stolen
the chemical for purposes of manufacturing methamphetamine.37 Law enforcement was able to closely follow the employee and locate the employee
by using a monitoring device that captured the beeper’s signal.38 Once the
signal was determined stationary at a secluded cabin in rural Wisconsin, police surveilled the cabin and secured a search warrant.39 Law enforcement
did not track the movement of the vat inside the cabin.40 Later, evidence of
the warrantless monitoring of the vat was admitted at trial.41 In applying
Katz, the Supreme Court held that that the governmental surveillance at issue
amounted to the following of an automobile on public streets and highways, a
place where the defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his

33. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21–22 (1968) (quoting Carroll v. United States,
267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925)). See also 2 LAFAVE, supra note 12, § 3.2(a). In Brinegar
v. United States, the Supreme Court held that probable cause determinations require
“‘less than evidence which would justify’ . . . conviction,” but “more than bare suspicion.” Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949) (quoting Locke v. United
States, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 339, 348 (1813)).
34. 2 LAFAVE, supra note 12, §§ 3.2(a), (e).
35. In the 1970s, the Court issued equivocal rulings on the probable cause requirement within the domain of state surveillance law. Compare United States v.
U.S. Dist. Court for E. Dist. of Mich., S. Div., 407 U.S. 297, 323–24 (1972), with
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745–46 (1979). Noticeably different in Smith v.
Maryland was the operation authorized under the Pen Registers and Trap and Trace
Statute, a legislative response to the Court’s Fourth Amendment doctrine, which had
made it increasingly difficult for law enforcement to surveil suspects by means of
telephonic communication. See Smith, 442 U.S. at 737. In Smith, the court held that
no search or seizure occurred. Id. at 745–46.
36. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983); United States v. Karo, 468
U.S. 705 (1984).
37. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 277.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 278.
40. Id. at 285.
41. Id. at 279.
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movements.42 It further held that the defendant did not have a subjective
expectation of privacy.43 Since the search satisfied both prongs of the Katz
test, the Court concluded there was no unreasonable search at issue.44
United States v. Karo presented the Supreme Court with another case
involving law enforcement’s use of a beeper hidden inside a container of
ether.45 The Court resolved the question left open by Knotts: whether the
initial installation of a beeper in a drum of chemicals was a search when the
drum was delivered to a buyer who had no knowledge of the hidden beeper.46
Again applying Katz, the Court found that the recipient of the chemical drum
had no subjective or reasonable expectation of privacy at the time of the installation of the beeper because he did not have possession of the drum at the
time.47 Further, whatever reasonable expectation of privacy the recipient had
was diminished when he consented to the possibility of something – including a beeper – being inside the drum that was not supposed to be there upon
transfer of possession.48
The Supreme Court emphasized that although the installation of the
beeper did not constitute a search or seizure under Katz, it was still possible
that an illegal search took place if the drum was monitored in a place the recipient did have an actual or reasonable expectation of privacy, such as his
residence.49 The Court further held that monitoring such devices required a
warrant but left open the possibility of exceptions under exigent circumstances.50
Knotts and Karo represent the Supreme Court’s approach to cases where
law enforcement uses digital signals to locate suspects, an approach the Court
used for the next quarter century.

42. Id. at 281.
43. Id. at 282.
44. Id. at 285. The Court’s opinion, however, noticeably neglected the pressing

issue of the warrantless installation of the beeper, which is noted in the concurrences
of Justices Brennan, Blackmun, and Stevens. Id. at 285–86 (Brennan, J., concurring).
This issue was resolved in Karo. United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 711 (1984).
45. Karo, 468 U.S. at 708.
46. Id. at 711.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. The Court noted, “This case thus presents the question whether the monitoring of a beeper in a private residence, a location not open to visual surveillance, violates the Fourth Amendment rights of those who have a justifiable interest in the privacy of the residence. . . . [W]e think that it does.” Id. at 714.
50. Id. at 714–15, 718. Exigent-circumstances doctrine instructs “that emergency conditions may justify a warrantless search and seizure, especially when there is
probable cause to believe that evidence will be removed or destroyed before a warrant
can be obtained.” Exigent-circumstances doctrine, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th
ed. 2014).
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C. Modern Surveillance Statutory Scheme
Surveillance law in Missouri operates under the federal statutory
scheme.51 CSLI is accessed by law enforcement officers under a federal law,
the Stored Communications Act (the “SCA”).52 The SCA requires companies, after receiving a proper application, to disclose the “contents” or “records” of electronic communications.53 An “electronic communication” is
“any transfer of signs, signals, writing, images, sounds, data, or intelligence .
. . transmitted . . . by a wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectronic[,] or
photooptical system.”54 Importantly, an electronic communication expressly
does not include “any communication from a tracking device.”55
The “contents” of an electronic communication are distinguishable from
the “records” of an electronic communication.56 “Contents” are defined as
“any information concerning the substance, purport, or meaning” of an electronic communication, and contents are obtained under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2703(a)
and (b).57 The contents of a communication are more relevant to issues involving wiretapping than location tracking.58 While not expressly defined
under the SCA, “records” presumably extends to any information, retained by
the cell service provider, that might not otherwise fall under the definition of
“contents.”59 Records are obtained under 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c). The SCA’s
records provisions are relevant to the present discussion of CSLI because
contents deal only with an electronic communication’s meaning, and CSLI is
merely data related to the electronic communication.60
There are five ways that electronic communication records, like CSLI,
may be subject to compelled disclosure by and to law enforcement under the
51. While Missouri Revised Statutes sections 542.400–542.420 provide local law
enforcement the ability to initiate a wiretap, state surveillance law is outdated by
modern technology and limited to “wire communications.” MO. REV. STAT. §
542.400 (Cum. Supp. 2013). “Wire communications” are defined as “any communication made . . . through the use of facilities for the transmission of communications
by the aid of wire, cable, or other like connection.” Id. § 542.400(12). While it is
unclear whether “or other like connection” could be extended to mean cell towers,
practically the statute is unused. In 2015, no Missouri court granted a surveillance
order under the statute. WIRETAP REPORT 2015, supra note 2, at tbl.2.
52. The Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2701–2712 (West 2017).
53. The SCA incorporates the definitions under 18 U.S.C. § 2510. Id. § 2711(1).
Further, 18 U.S.C. § 2703 requires electronic communication providers to turn over
the “contents” of electronic communications under qualified circumstances. Id. §
2703(a).
54. Id. § 2510(12).
55. Id. § 2510(12)(C). A “tracking device” is defined in 18 U.S.C. § 3117(b).
56. The “contents” of an electronic communication are distinguished from “records” of an electronic communication in 18 U.S.C. § 2510(8).
57. § 2510(8). See also id. §§ 2703(a)–(b).
58. See CARR, BELLIA & CREUTZ, supra note 8, § 4:78.
59. See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c).
60. See CARR, BELLIA & CREUTZ, supra note 8, § 4:78.
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SCA, although only two are relevant for the purpose of this Note.61 First,
under § 2703(c)(1)(A), law enforcement may compel disclosure of electronic
communication records when a warrant is obtained pursuant to federal or
state rules of criminal procedure.62 Second, under § 2703(c)(1)(B), law enforcement may compel disclosure under a court order.63
Warrant procedures for electronic communication records sought under
§ 2703(c)(1)(A) are no different than other warrants and thus are subject to
the same constitutional requirements.64 Probable cause must then be shown
under § 2703(c)(1)(A).65 If the warrant is sought before a federal court, the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure expressly require a showing of probable
cause to obtain a warrant “to search for and seize a person or property or to
install and use a tracking device.”66 Under this rule, a tracking device is defined as “an electronic or mechanical device which permits the tracking of the
movement of a person or object.”67
However, if law enforcement does not have the necessary evidence to
make the required probable cause showing, then it may obtain CSLI under the
second method of § 2703(c)(1)(B), which has a lower standard.68 Courts
have held that this lower statutory standard is constitutionally permissible
because the third-party disclosure doctrine applies to electronic communication records.69 The third-party doctrine instructs that an individual does not
have a reasonable expectation of privacy when that individual voluntarily
61. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c).
62. Id. § 2703(c)(1)(A). If seeking a warrant in state court, then applicable state

rules of criminal procedure govern, while if seeking a warrant before a federal court,
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure operate. Id. §§ 2703(a)–(b). Since most
warrants issued for required records disclosure under the SCA are sought in federal
court, this Note primarily focuses on the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure when
relevant discussion arises. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
63. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(1)(B). Section 2703(c)(1) also provides that a record
may be disclosed with the consent of the customer, for purposes of investigating a
telemarketing scheme or when the information sought relates to billing information.
Id. §§ 2703(c)(1)(C)–(E).
64. Section 2703(c)(1)(A) relies on “the procedures described in the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure (or, in the case of a State Court, issued using State warrant procedures).” Id. § 2703(c)(1)(A). Courts have held that search and seizure provisions of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure “embod[y] standards which conform with the requirements of the Fourth Amendment.” United States v. Haywood,
464 F.2d 756, 760 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
65. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41 lays out the requirements of obtaining
a warrant in federal courts. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41.
66. Id. at 41(d)(1).
67. The rule adopts the definition of a tracking device as found in 18 U.S.C. §
3117(b). FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(a)(2)(E).
68. See, e.g., In re U.S. for an Order Authorizing the Release of Historical CellSite Info., 809 F. Supp. 2d 113, 115 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (holding “[t]his showing is
lower than the probable cause standard required for a search warrant”).
69. See, e.g., United States v. Graham, 824 F.3d 421, 427 (4th Cir. 2016).
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discloses information to third parties.70 As a result of this exception to the
constitutional probable cause requirement, under § 2703(c)(1)(B), a court
order for disclosure of CSLI need only be supported by a standard of “specific and articulable facts” that show “reasonable grounds to believe” that the
record is “relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation.”71 Importantly, a court order issued pursuant to § 2703(c)(1)(B) is expressly prohibited if it is in contravention of state law.72
CSLI is sometimes sought by law enforcement under joint authority of
the Pen Registers73 and Trap and Trace Devices74 Statute, 18 U.S.C. §§
3121–3127. The Pen Registers Statute was amended in 2001 by the USA
PATRIOT Act to include “signaling information” as part of its definition of
pen registers.75 However, the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act of 1994 (“CALEA”) provides that “call-identifying information”
obtained under the Pen Registers Statute “shall not include any information
that may disclose the physical location of the subscriber.”76 The legal standard under the Pen Registers Statute to obtain electronic communication records is even lower than the SCA’s standard. Law enforcement requesting an
order to establish a pen register or trap and trace device need only show the
information “likely to be obtained . . . is relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation.”77 However, some courts have held that law enforcement seek70. The third-party disclosure doctrine is the view that a subject surrenders
Fourth Amendment protections by revealing information to a third party. Orin S.
Kerr, The Case for the Third-Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. REV. 561, 563 (2009).
71. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2012).
72. Id. (“In the case of a State governmental authority, such a court order shall
not issue if prohibited by the law of such State.”).
73. A pen register is a device or process that “records or decodes dialing, routing, addressing, or signaling information transmitted by an instrument or facility from
which a wire or electronic communication is transmitted,” as long as the transmission
does not include contents. Id. § 3127(3).
74. A trap and trace device “captures the incoming electronic or other impulses
which identify the originating number or other dialing, routing, addressing, and signaling information reasonably likely to identify the source of a wire or electronic
communication, provided, however, that such information shall not include the contents of any communication.” Id. § 3127(4).
75. In re Application of U.S. for Order, 497 F. Supp. 2d 301, 306 (D.P.R. 2007)
(discussing the legislative history of the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act and the Pen Registers Statute).
76. 47 U.S.C. § 1002(a)(2)(B) (2012).
77. 18 U.S.C. § 3123(a)(1). It is not immediately clear whether the standard laid
out under the Pen Registers Statute is higher, lower, or the same as the standard under
the SCA. The SCA requires the government to offer “specific and articulable facts”
showing “reasonable grounds” that the information sought would be relevant to an
ongoing criminal investigation. Id. § 2703(d). The Pen Registers Statute merely
requires the government to certify that the information “likely to be obtained” is relevant. Id. § 3123(a)(1). The offering of “specific and articulable” facts requirement,
which requires the government to detail its reasonable belief that the sought records
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ing real-time CSLI cannot do so under CALEA – meaning CALEA can only
be used to collect historic CSLI.78
Federal courts across the country have disagreed about the necessity of a
warrant supported by probable cause for obtaining real-time CSLI. Some
courts have held under the third-party disclosure doctrine that accessing realtime CSLI is not an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment because there is no objective expectation of privacy.79 Other courts have held
that the third-party disclosure doctrine does not apply because users do not
voluntarily choose to share their location information with their service providers.80 Courts in the First,81 Second,82 Fourth,83 Fifth,84 Sixth,85 Seventh,86

will be relevant, is more strenuous than a mere government certification that the records are “likely” to be relevant. Id.
78. See United States v. Espudo, 954 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1043 (S.D. Cal. 2013)
(holding that a warrant sought under the hybrid standards of the SCA and Pen Registers Statute must be supported by probable cause because CALEA’s legislative record
does not support a hybrid theory interpretation of CALEA).
79. See, e.g., In re Smartphone Geolocation Data Application, 977 F. Supp. 2d
129, 136 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (holding that cell phone users agree to be tracked because
of the general public’s awareness of geolocation tracking on cell phones, along with
cell phone users’ agreements with service providers and manufactures terms). See
also United States v. Salas, No. 1496, 2013 WL 4459858, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 16,
2013) (holding that the third-party disclosure doctrine applies to CSLI).
80. See State v. Andrews, 134 A.3d 324, 351 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2016) (holding
that the third-party disclosure doctrine is “ill suited to the digital age” and that cell
phone users do not “voluntarily convey” information to service providers (quoting
United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 417 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring))).
81. See, e.g., In re Applications of U.S. for an Order Authorizing Continued Use
of a Pen Register & Trap & Trace With Caller Identification Device, 530 F. Supp. 2d
367, 368–69 (D. Mass. 2007) (holding that the SCA was a sufficient standard for
historic CSLI, but not for real-time or prospective data, which required a probable
cause showing for required disclosure).
82. United States v. Lambis, 197 F. Supp. 3d 606, 611 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (holding
that law enforcement needed an independent warrant supported by probable cause to
use a cell-site simulator to obtain real-time CSLI).
83. In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Authorizing Disclosure of Location Info. of a Specified Wireless Tel., 849 F. Supp. 2d 526, 541 (D. Md. 2011) (holding that probable cause must be shown to obtain a warrant for real-time CSLI because
cell phone users keep their phone “on their person when conducting daily activities”
and that cell phone users have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their movements).
84. In re Application of the U.S. for an Order for Authorization to Obtain Location Data Concerning an AT&T Cellular Tel., 102 F. Supp. 3d 884, 895–96 (N.D.
Miss. 2015) (noting the cautious approach of a U.S. Attorney who sought a warrant
supported by probable cause “pending clarification regarding the applicable constitutional standards in the prospective cell phone data context”).
85. United States v. Powell, 943 F. Supp. 2d 759, 778 (E.D. Mich. 2013).
86. In re U.S. for an Order Authorizing the Disclosure of Prospective Cell Site
Info., No. 06-MISC-004, 2006 WL 2871743, at *5 (E.D. Wis. Oct. 6, 2006) (holding
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and Ninth Circuits have required a warrant issued on probable cause before
police can collect real-time CSLI.87 But courts within the Tenth88 and Eleventh89 Circuits only require the fulfillment of one of the lesser standards articulated in the SCA or Pen Register Statutes. Circuit courts that have addressed the issue of CSLI include the Fourth,90 Sixth,91 and Eleventh92 Circuits. The Eighth Circuit has not addressed the issue of Fourth Amendment
searches and real-time CSLI under the SCA.93
Despite the discordant body of case law surrounding the issue of CSLI,
recent developments at the Supreme Court and corresponding reactions by
state legislatures appear to be trending in favor of individual digital privacy
interests.

III. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Part A of this section first discusses recent developments in case law
that have potential bearing on the issue of Missouri surveillance law and electronic communications and data. Part B of this section then discusses Missouri’s recent constitutional amendment to article I, section 15.

A. Relevant Case Law Developments
Whether the monitoring of real-time CSLI is a search under the Fourth
Amendment is an open question under Supreme Court jurisprudence. Relevant developments involve the Supreme Court’s recent consideration of the
nature of Global Positioning System (“GPS”) information,94 as well as a law
enforcement search of a cell phone incident to arrest.95
that the lesser standards of the SCA and Pen Registers Statute were insufficient to
support a warrant seeking to obtain CSLI).
87. In re Application for Tel. Info. Needed for a Criminal Investigation, 119 F.
Supp. 3d 1011, 1039 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (holding that the third-party disclosure doctrine
did not apply because cell phone users do not generally consent through privacy policies to the warrantless acquisition of CSLI).
88. United States v. Takai, 943 F. Supp. 2d 1315, 1323 (D. Utah 2013) (holding
that warrant exceptions applied in emergency circumstances).
89. United States v. Booker, No. 1:11–CR–255–1–TWT, 2013 WL 2903562, at
*7 (N.D. Ga. June 13, 2013).
90. United States v. Graham, 824 F.3d 421, 427 (4th Cir. 2016).
91. United States v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880, 888 (6th Cir. 2016).
92. Davis v. United States, 785 F.3d 498, 511 (11th Cir. 2015).
93. The Eighth Circuit has analyzed emails under the SCA. See United States v.
Bach, 310 F.3d 1063, 1068 (8th Cir. 2002) (holding that a search and seizure of
emails conducted by technicians as directed by law enforcement was not a violation
of the Fourth Amendment); Anzaldua v. Ne. Ambulance & Fire Prot. Dist., 793 F.3d
822, 842 (8th Cir. 2015) (holding that sent and draft emails were not “stored” within
the meaning of the SCA).
94. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 402 (2012).
95. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2480 (2014).
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In United States v. Jones, the Supreme Court returned to issues relating
to law enforcement’s use of tracking devices.96 In Jones, the Court held that
a warrantless attachment of a GPS tracking device to a vehicle was an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment.97 The investigating officers
obtained a warrant authorizing the use of an electronic tracking device on the
suspect’s wife’s Jeep.98 However, the officers failed to install the device
during the period authorized by the warrant.99 Undeterred, law enforcement
installed the GPS device a day after the period lapsed.100 Law enforcement
then tracked the suspect’s movement for the next twenty-eight days.101
Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia resurrected the trespassory test
often used by the Supreme Court prior to Katz. Scalia argued that the Katz
test was an addition to – not a substitute for – the common law trespassory
test.102 Scalia reasoned that the Katz test would still apply in situations involving “merely the transmission of electronic signals without trespass.”103
In concurrence, Justice Sotomayor raised concerns about the application
of the third-party disclosure doctrine in the context of surveillance and electronic communications.104 Also writing in concurrence, Justice Alito argued
that the trespassory test presented numerous problems105 in a digital age.106
He further argued that even the Katz test might be inadequate to address privacy concerns arising from the monitoring of electronic devices.107 Finally,
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

Jones, 565 U.S. at 404.
Id.
Id. at 402–03.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 403.
Id. at 406–07. Scalia read Knotts and Karo to support this argument because
neither case questioned the unauthorized installation of a beeper by law enforcement
(Knotts) or a third party (Karo). Id. at 409.
103. Id. at 411.
104. Id. at 416 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
105. First, the majority’s disregard for the use of GPS for purposes of long-term
tracking, instead emphasizing the “relatively minor” attachment of the GPS to a vehicle. Id. at 424–25 (Alito, J., concurring). Second, the majority’s approach leads to
“incongruous results,” in that if police attach a GPS to a vehicle, then the Fourth
Amendment applies, but if the police follow the vehicle “for a much longer period
using unmarked cars and aerial assistance,” then there are no Fourth Amendment
issues. Id. at 425. Third, under the majority’s approach, the “coverage of the Fourth
Amendment may vary from state to state” based upon the state’s approach to community property. Id. at 425–26. Some “non-community-property” states would interpret
the registration of the Jeep in the wife’s name as presumptive evidence that the wife
was the sole owner. Id. at 426. Finally, the majority’s approach fails to account for
cases of involuntary transmission of electronic signaling, such as tracking a vehicle
by activating stolen vehicle detection systems or potentially CSLI, because no physical touching of the property has occurred. Id.
106. Id. at 418.
107. Id. at 426–27.

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2017

13

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 82, Iss. 2 [2017], Art. 9

496

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82

he suggested that the most effective way to check the surveillance power of
the government was through legislation.108
Two years later, in Riley v. California, the Supreme Court unanimously
rejected the incident to arrest warrant exception for searches of data on cell
phones.109 Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Roberts emphasized the
unique nature of the cell phone, based on its enormous capacity to store information and the nature of the information stored on a cell phone.110 Roberts outlined the intimate nature of stored cell phone data, potentially ranging
from sexual preferences to personal concerns about one’s health.111 Importantly, Roberts saw that the search of stored data on a cell phone could be
far more invasive than the search of a home.112 Roberts echoed Sotomayor’s
concern in United States v. Jones, writing that cell phone location information
is standard on most modern phones “and can reconstruct someone’s specific
movements down to the minute, not only around town but also within a particular building.”113 The Supreme Court’s ruling in Riley recognized a longvocalized concern regarding the nature of privacy in a digital age.

B. Article I, Section 15
In 2014, Missouri amended article I, section 15 of the Missouri Constitution to read,
That the people shall be secure in their persons, papers, homes, effects, and electronic communications and data, from unreasonable
searches and seizures; and no warrant to search any place, or seize any
person or thing, or access electronic data or communication, shall issue without describing the place to be searched, or the person or thing
to be seized, or the data or communication to be accessed, as nearly as
may be; nor without probable cause, supported by written oath or af114
firmation.

The amendment came before the public for a vote upon the legislature’s
initiative.115 Upon first introduction, the legislature’s bill summary read that
prior to issuance, a warrant “must describe the data or communication to be

108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Id. at 429–30.
Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2485 (2014).
Id. at 2489–90.
Id.
Id. at 2490–91.
Id. at 2490.
MO. CONST. art. I, § 15 (emphases added).
S.J. Res. 27, 97th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2014).
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accessed and be supported by probable cause.”116 The language of the proposed amendment remained unchanged throughout the legislative process.117
By passing the amendment, Missouri voters became the first state to enshrine protections for electronic communication and data in their constitution.118 In a media report following the passage of the amendment, the bill’s
original sponsor, Senator Robert Schaaf, noted that the amendment’s legal
impact would “take time to sort out,” but the legislative intent was to afford
electronic communications and data the same protections provided to other
enumerations of “person, paper, home, and effects,” as provided under article
I, section 15.119
While the Supreme Court of Missouri has yet to substantially address
the amendment to article I, section 15, the Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District, has discussed the implications of the new “electronic communications and data” provision in a context unrelated to CSLI.120 In State ex rel.
Koster v. Charter Communications, Inc., the Western District interpreted the
recent amendment as having no effect on current search and seizure law.121
The court held that “article I, section 15, even as amended, is not currently
measurably more restrictive on the government than is the Fourth Amendment.”122 The Supreme Court of Missouri has traditionally read article I,
section 15 to be “coextensive” with the Fourth Amendment.123
However, these interpretations of article I, section 15 do not negate the
clear requirement of a warrant supported by probable cause when law enforcement seeks electronic communications and data. This requirement of
probable cause extends to disclosure requests sought under § 2703(c) of the
SCA for purposes of monitoring real-time CSLI, despite the SCA’s articulated standard of “specific and articulable facts” for the reasons set forth in the
next section.
116. Id.
117. Compare S.J. Res. 27, 97th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2014) (pre-

filed Dec. 1, 2013, version), with S.J. Res. 27, 97th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo.
2014) (enacted).
118. Becca Stanek, Missouri Passes Constitutional Amendment to Protect Electronic Privacy, TIME (Aug. 6, 2014), http://time.com/3087608/missouri-electronicprivacy-amendment/. A number of other states have since implemented statutory
measures affording similar protections to electronic communications and data. State
Laws Related to Internet Privacy, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Jan. 5, 2016),
http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-technology/statelaws-related-to-internet-privacy.aspx.
119. Stanek, supra note 118.
120. State ex rel. Koster v. Charter Commc’ns, Inc., 461 S.W.3d 851, 857–58
(Mo. Ct. App. 2015).
121. Id. at 858. The Western District wrongly interpreted the effect of the
amendment on article I, section 15 by neglecting long-practiced rules of constitutional
construction. See Pestka v. State, 493 S.W.3d 405, 408–09 (Mo. 2016) (en banc).
See also infra Part IV.A.
122. Charter, 461 S.W.3d at 858.
123. State v. Hosier, 454 S.W.3d 883, 892 n.6 (Mo. 2015) (en banc).
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IV. DISCUSSION
Article I, section 15 requires a warrant supported by probable cause for
purposes of monitoring real-time CSLI because the provision is broader in its
scope of protections than the Fourth Amendment. Article I, section 15 is
broader in its scope of protections than the Fourth Amendment both on its
face and because of its legislative purpose. The legislative purpose of the
amendment defeats the warrant exception for real-time CSLI under the thirdparty disclosure doctrine because CSLI is qualitatively a different kind of
record than what is traditionally treated as a record under the doctrine. Moreover, probable cause must support a warrant for real-time CSLI because the
SCA’s standard is ill-fitting in the circumstances that real-time CSLI is often
sought.

A. Article I, Section 15 Is Broader on Its Face and Through Its Legislative Purpose Than the Fourth Amendment
The plain text of article I, section 15 includes a specific enumeration for
“electronic communications and data,” language that is absent from the
Fourth Amendment.124 In Missouri, constitutional provisions “are subject to
the same rules of construction as other laws, except that constitutional provisions are given a broader construction due to their more permanent character.”125 Additionally, it must be assumed that every word “contained in a
constitutional provision has effect, meaning, and is not mere surplusage.”126
Generally, words are interpreted to “give effect to their plain . . . meaning.”127
One of the accepted canons of statutory construction is an examination of the
legislative development of the provision and related statutes.128
Article I, section 15’s language, “electronic communications and data,”
cannot be read to be “mere surplusage” because every word “contained in a
constitutional provision” is given meaning and effect.129 To read article I,
section 15 to be coextensive with the Fourth Amendment after its 2014
amendment, however, does render “electronic communications and data”
mere surplusage. Article I, section 15 was read coextensively with the Fourth
Amendment prior to article I, section 15’s amendment.130 So Missouri courts
124. Compare U.S. CONST. amend. IV, with MO. CONST. art. I, § 15.
125. Pestka, 493 S.W.3d at 408–09 (quoting Neske v. City of St. Louis, 218

S.W.3d 417, 421 (Mo. 2007) (en banc)).
126. Id. at 409 (quoting State v. Honeycutt, 421 S.W.3d 410, 415 (Mo. 2013) (en
banc)).
127. Id. (quoting Wright-Jones v. Nasheed, 368 S.W.3d 157, 159 (Mo. 2012) (en
banc)).
128. Id.
129. Id. (quoting Honeycutt, 421 S.W.3d at 415).
130. See State v. Lovelady, 432 S.W.3d 187, 190 (Mo. 2014) (en banc); State v.
Grayson, 336 S.W.3d 138, 151 n.4 (Mo. 2011) (en banc). Compare MO. CONST. art.
I, § 15 (current), with MO. CONST. art. I, § 15 (1945).
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understood the Fourth Amendment to either (1) not protect or (2) already
protect “electronic communications and data.” In either case, a postamendment coextensive reading of article I, section 15 would render “electronic communications and data” surplusage. Such a reading is to be avoided
under Missouri’s rules of construction.131 Therefore, article I, section 15
must be broader in its scope of protections than the Fourth Amendment because Missouri changed its search and seizure language, which had previously mirrored the Fourth Amendment, to include a specific enumeration for
“electronic communications and data,” and this change is to be given meaning and effect.132
This does not resolve, however, what the meaning and effect of those
added protections are under article I, section 15. To determine this, under
Missouri’s rules of construction, “electronic communications and data” must
be interpreted to give effect to the plain meaning, alongside an examination
of the legislative development of the provision and related statutes.133
“Electronic communications and data” is a broad category, the definition of which Missouri courts have not limited; nor has the legislature defined
it.134 In the case of article I, section 15, the development of the ballot initiative through the General Assembly offers little insight into the legislative
meaning of “electronic communications and data” because the provision was
adopted without substantial alteration.135 No other relevant state statute em-

131. Prior to the passage of the 2014 amendment to article I, section 15, the court
held the provision to be “coextensive with the Fourth Amendment; consequently ‘the
same analysis applies under both provisions.’” Lovelady, 432 S.W.3d at 190 (quoting
Grayson, 336 S.W.3d at 143 n.2). In 2015, the court discussed the issue of real-time
CSLI and probable cause requirements. State v. Hosier, 454 S.W.3d 883, 892 (Mo.
2015) (en banc). The discussion did not produce a relevant holding because the
events of the case took place prior to the amendment; however, it did indicate that the
court is well aware of the unresolved question. Id. The court discussed “[t]he issue
of whether police must make a probable cause showing in order to obtain real-time
cell phone location data” as one “frequently challenged,” but “[n]o Missouri state
court has ruled on [the] issue.” Id.
132. See Honeycutt, 421 S.W.3d at 414–15 (holding that the court’s “primary goal
in interpreting Missouri’s constitution is to ‘ascribe to the words of a constitutional
provision the meaning that the people understood them to have when the provision
was adopted’” (quoting Farmer v. Kinder, 89 S.W.3d 447, 452 (Mo. 2002) (en
banc))). It follows that if prior to its amendment, article I, section 15 and the Fourth
Amendment were coextensive, then following its amendment, article I, section 15
extends beyond the protections of the Fourth Amendment. The extent of these protections depends on what “meaning and intent” are given to “electronic communications
and data.” Id.
133. Pestka, 493 S.W.3d at 409.
134. Hosier, 454 S.W.3d at 892 n.6.
135. Compare S.J. Res. 27, 97th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2014) (prefiled Dec. 1, 2013, version), with S.J. Res. 27, 97th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo.
2014) (enacted).
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ploys the phrase “electronic communications and data.”136 With little help
forthcoming from Missouri’s scant legislative history, it is helpful to look to
federal statutes and other jurisdictions to determine what the legislature was
intending to do.
Under 18 U.S.C. § 2510, which the SCA relies on for definitions, an
“electronic communication” is “any transfer of signs, signals, writing, images, sounds, data, or intelligence of any nature transmitted in whole or in part
by a wire, radio, [or] electromagnetic . . . that affects interstate or foreign
commerce[,] . . . [except] any communication from a tracking device.”137 It is
possible to conclude that Missouri’s legislature, in contemplating an amendment to its constitutional search and seizure provision, would have considered
the federal scheme governing the search and seizure of electronic communications. Further, it is reasonable that this definition was the one intended by
the legislature when it proposed amending article I, section 15 to include protections for “electronic communication and data” because both provisions’
use of the term of art is in the context of search and seizure by a governmental entity.
A look at other jurisdictions further supports an adoption of 18 U.S.C. §
2510’s definition of “electronic communication.” While Missouri was the
first state to enshrine protections for digital privacy in its constitution, it was
not alone in taking up Justice Alito’s suggestion for legislative action mentioned in his concurrence in United States v. Jones.138 Several other states
have passed legislation affording protections to digital privacy.139 Two statutes are noteworthy for the current discussion.
First, Maine enacted an electronic privacy statute in 2014.140 The statute
imposes a warrant requirement, supported by probable cause,141 on law enforcement when it is seeking to obtain location information, such as CSLI, of

136. An unrelated state regulation uses the phrase “electronic communications
and data” in the context of defining a “statistical agent” as part of Missouri’s Life
Insurance and Annuity Standards regulations. MO. CODE REGS. ANN. tit. 20, § 4001.170(1)(C) (2017).
137. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12) (2012). A tracking device is defined as “an electronic
or mechanical device which permits the tracking of the movement of a person or
object.” Id. § 3117(b).
138. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 427 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring).
139. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 644.21 (2017); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN.
art. 18.02 (West 2017); UTAH CODE ANN. § 63D-2-103 (West 2017); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 13.15 (West 2017); CAL. GOV’T CODE § 11019.9 (West 2017). This list is not
exhaustive.
140. Hanni Fakhoury, Why Wait for Congress? States Passing Electronic Privacy
Legislations, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND.: DEEPLINKS (June 3, 2013),
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/05/why-wait-congress-states-passing-electronicprivacy-legislation. See also 16 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 648 (2017).
141. 16 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 648.
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an electronic device.142 Second, California enacted its Electronic Communications Privacy Act, which likewise requires a showing of probable cause143
upon issuance of a warrant to obtain electronic information.144 Under California’s law, electronic information is defined as a class of data resulting
from an electronic communication.145 California’s definition of electronic
communication tracks the language of 18 U.S.C. § 2510.146
In proposing a referendum to alter article I, section 15, Missouri likely
shared the same understanding as California as to the meaning of “electronic
communications” and its “data,” as both legislatures reacted to the same digital privacy concerns raised by United States v. Jones.147 Further, real-time
CSLI should be held within the meaning of “communications data” because
other similarly reacting legislatures, like Maine, specifically contemplated it
to be a type of data identified as a concern by the Jones concurrences.148
Finally, the canons of construction under Pestka require a broad construction
of article I, section 15 because of the “permanent character of constitutional
provisions,” resulting in the incorporation of CSLI within the meaning of
communication data.149
A broad construction of “electronic communications and data” does not,
however, necessarily overcome application of traditional constitutional exceptions to the warrant requirement for searches and seizures – such as the
third-party disclosure doctrine. To support the claim that a warrant supported
by probable cause is required to obtain real-time CSLI, it must be shown that
the third-party disclosure doctrine does not apply.

142. Maine’s statute was enacted the same year article I, section 15 of the Missouri Constitution was amended. See 16 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 648; see also
MO. CONST. art I, § 15.
143. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1546.1(d)(2) (West 2017).
144. Id.
145. Id. §§ 1546.1(c)–(d), (h).
146. Compare id. §§ 1546.1(c)–(d), (h), with 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12) (2012).
147. Indeed, legislators who advocated for the referendum’s passage expressly
noted that the amendment would protect “private communications and data from
being sent[ or] disclosed . . . to some other third party.” See Cody Newill, Voter
Guide to Missouri Constitutional Amendment 9, KCUR 89.3 (July 28, 2014),
http://kcur.org/post/voter-guide-missouri-constitutional-amendment-9.
Sotomayor
and Alito’s concerns about the third-party disclosure doctrine drove their discussion
in United States v. Jones. See supra Part III.A.
148. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 417 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
See also id. at 418–31 (Alito, J., concurring).
149. See Pestka v. State, 493 S.W.3d 405, 408–09 (Mo. 2016) (en banc).
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B. The Third-Party Disclosure Doctrine Does Not Apply to Real-Time
CSLI Under Article I, Section 15
The third-party disclosure doctrine is often used by law enforcement to
obtain digital records held by cell phone companies.150 It has historically
applied in two types of circumstances: those involving undercover informants
and those involving third-party business records.151 A business record is “[a]
report, memorandum, or other record made usually in the course of business.”152 The business records class of circumstances is relevant in the CSLI
context.
Because real-time CSLI is qualitatively different than other business
records accessible under the third-party disclosure doctrine, the doctrine
should not apply to real-time CSLI under article I, section 15.153 This qualitative difference was noted by Justices Alito and Sotomayor in Jones, along
with Chief Justice Roberts in Riley.154
In Riley v. California, the Supreme Court recognized for the first time
the problems posed by allowing law enforcement to access cell phone data
and records, including locational data.155 The Court outlined three distinguishing features that inform how courts analyze privacy issues relating to
cell phones and records access.156 First, cell phones have many distinct types
of information, including addresses, videos, and bank statements, that reveal
more than any isolated record.157 Second, cell phones have a large capacity
to store this varied information.158 Third, cell phones are more pervasive than
any other type of device that stores records.159 The Court’s skepticism about
giving law enforcement easy access to cell phone data and records resulted in
a ruling that required law enforcement to obtain a warrant to search a cell
phone because of the vast and potentially intimate nature of personal information contained on cell phones.160 A search of a cell phone “bears little
resemblance” to other types of physical searches, including those of homes,
because cell phone data may be used to “reconstruct someone’s specific

150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

Kerr, supra note 70, at 563.
Id. at 566.
Business record, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
Stanek, supra note 118.
In Jones, Justice Sotomayor notes this tension between the third-party doctrine and digital privacy issues. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 417–18 (2012)
(Sotomayor, J., concurring). See also Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2490
(2014).
155. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2485.
156. Id. at 2489.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 2485.
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movements down to the minute, not only around town but also within a particular building.”161
The addition of “electronic communications and data” to article I, section 15 may be interpreted as a response to the Court’s turn in Jones. Scalia’s
application of the trespassory test in Jones could be viewed as narrowing the
Fourth Amendment protections to items enumerated in the Fourth Amendment, including “persons, houses, papers, and effects.” Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia argued that the privacy interest at issue during a search
or seizure was to be narrowly analyzed as a property interest in the thing being searched.162 Scalia concluded that an unreasonable search had occurred
during the GPS monitoring only because the GPS was placed on the defendant’s wife’s property, her Jeep.163 This interference with the private property
interest meant the search failed the trespassory test.
But it is more likely that Jones will be remembered for its concurrences,
where Justices Alito and Sotomayor wrote separately to express concern
about the trespassory approach in the case of CSLI.164 Justice Sotomayor
strongly advocated the reconsideration of the third-party disclosure doctrine,
writing that it “is ill suited to the digital age, in which people reveal a great
deal of information about themselves to third parties in the course of carrying
out mundane tasks.”165
Justice Alito noted that Scalia’s trespassory approach is problematic in
the case of surreptitiously obtained cell phone data because there is no physical touching to satisfy trespass requirements, and the property interest is tenuous.166 Instead, Alito suggested that Congress was best fitted to resolve the
Fourth Amendment problems presented by the confluence of new technologies, like smart phones.167 Seemingly on cue, Missouri reacted with its
amendment to article I, section 15. As a response to Jones, Missouri’s
amendment to article I, section 15 expresses a clear and unambiguous policy
to protect the ever-increasingly intimate nature of cell phone data and records.
Modern cell phones provide stringent encryption capabilities and utilize biometric software to protect the privacy of their owners. These precautions
indicate that both cell phone companies and users have a strong expectation
of privacy regarding data associated with cell phones.
Beyond the mere policy endorsement of Missourians, real-time CSLI is
a qualitatively different type of record than what is often obtained under the
161. Id. at 2490. The Court went on: “Indeed, a cell phone search would typically
expose to the government far more than the most exhaustive search of a house: A
phone . . . contains a broad array of private information never found in a home in any
form – unless the phone is.” Id. at 2491.
162. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 405 (2012).
163. Id. at 404–05.
164. Id. at 424–27 (Alito, J., concurring); see also id. at 414 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
165. Id. at 417 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
166. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
167. Jones, 565 U.S. at 429–30 (Alito, J., concurring).
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third-party disclosure doctrine because cell phone users do not voluntarily
disclose CSLI in the same way that other business records are voluntarily
disclosed.168 The differences between voluntary disclosure of CSLI and other
business records accessed under the third-party disclosure doctrine are that
(1) cell phones are nearly ubiquitous and (2) carried on a person nearly everywhere he or she goes, including inside the constitutionally protected area of
the home. This ubiquity results in real-time CSLI functioning more like a
tracking device than a business record. Cell phones emit signals by merely
being turned on. The voluntary act of turning on a phone and carrying it on
one’s person seems quite different than signing a business record, such as a
bank document.169
Federal and state warrant procedures emphatically require a showing of
probable cause to use a tracking device in criminal investigations.170 So if
CSLI functions like a tracking device, then probable cause should be needed
to support a warrant that seeks to obtain real-time CSLI.
Under this view, real-time CSLI may not be sought under the SCA’s
court order provision, which only requires a showing of “specific and articulable facts” that the resulting evidence is likely to be relevant to an ongoing
criminal investigation.171 The court order provision implicitly reads real-time
CSLI to be like other business records excepted by the third-party disclosure
doctrine. But since real-time CSLI is more like a tracking device than a business record, this method of going around the probable cause requirement
should be foreclosed to law enforcement.
This view is further buttressed when considering that the SCA expressly
states that its lesser standard does not apply if in contravention to state law.172
Since Missouri’s article I, section 15, a state law, encompasses real-time
CSLI, probable cause should be shown to obtain real-time CSLI.

168. See, e.g., In re Application of U.S. for an Order Authorizing Disclosure of
Location Info. of a Specified Wireless Tel., 849 F. Supp. 2d 526, 538 n.6 (D. Md.
2011).
169. The inadequacy of the third-party disclosure doctrine is further highlighted
when considering the emergence of the doctrine: “The third party and public exposure
doctrines emerged at a time when modern surveillance capabilities were beyond imagination. Today, these previously unimaginable technologies are not merely law
enforcement tools; they are essential parts of our daily lives.” Shaun B. Spencer, The
Aggregation Principle and the Future of Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence, 41 NEW
ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 289, 301 (2015).
170. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(d)(1).
171. See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c) (2012).
172. The statute reads: “In the case of a State governmental authority, such a court
order shall not issue if prohibited by the law of such State.” Id. § 2703(d).
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C. The SCA’s “Specific and Articulable Facts” Standard Is Ill-Fitting
for CSLI Obtainment
Prior to Missouri’s amendment to its constitutional search and seizure
provision, law enforcement was permitted under the SCA’s § 2703(c) to obtain real-time CSLI on issuance of a warrant supported by the lesser standard
of “specific and articulable facts” that the communication was relevant to an
ongoing criminal investigation. This standard was ill-fitting to CSLI from the
beginning of the SCA, and article I, section 15’s realignment to the probable
cause standard fits the surveillance tactic with an appropriate standard.
The SCA’s “specific and articulable facts” standard was not invented by
Congress.173 Instead, the language originated in the Supreme Court and has
subsequently appeared in over seventy of their opinions.174 Relevant cases
analyze the “reasonable suspicion” law enforcement must have to authorize a
limited search of a person or location.175 The showing of “specific and articulable facts” is typically made to justify a search after the fact.176 This
alone makes the standard ill-fitting to real-time CSLI, which seeks to obtain
future information rather than to justify a prior search. If that were not
enough, many of the cases allowing a search under a “specific and articulable
facts” standard only permitted the search because of the imminent potential
danger presented to law enforcement or because the search was conducted
during the commission of an ongoing crime.177 Rarely is there an imminent
potential danger presented to law enforcement during a search of real-time
CSLI, and should such a case exist, the exigent-circumstances doctrine would
apply. Likewise, the exigent-circumstances doctrine would seem to apply if
law enforcement knew that a cell phone owner was committing a felony.
But, in such a case, law enforcement would have to possess an inhuman
clairvoyance to predict crimes before they happen.

173. CLIFFORD S. FISHMAN & ANNE T. MCKENNA, WIRETAPPING AND
EAVESDROPPING § 7:51.20 (2016).
174. Id.
175. Id. See Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 334 (1990) (holding that protective
sweep of home was authorized when police did not have probable cause or a warrant
but could demonstrate a reasonable belief of specific and articulable facts that a potential danger was posed to the police officers at the arresting scene). See also Terry
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 24 (1968) (holding that a pat down search was reasonable when
law enforcement had a justified belief based on suspicious behavior that the arrested
individual may pose a threat of danger).
176. FISHMAN & MCKENNA, supra note 173.
177. See Buie, 494 U.S. at 334 (holding that the Fourth Amendment permits law
enforcement to conduct a protective sweep to search for an individual posing a danger
to law enforcement officers or others); United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 227–
29 (1985) (holding that law enforcement may conduct a Terry stop when law enforcement believes that the person subject to the stop is involved in or is wanted in
connection with a completed felony).
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For these reasons, probable cause is the appropriate standard for a surveillance tactic like monitoring real-time CSLI. With the amendment to article I, section 15, probable cause must now support a warrant to obtain realtime CSLI.

V. CONCLUSION
Legislatures across the country have responded vigorously to rising concerns over digital privacy and locational data. Many states have enacted statutes that extend more protections for digital privacy. In Missouri, these protections have extended to the search of real-time CSLI. With its amendment
to article I, section 15, Missouri has abrogated the application of the thirdparty disclosure doctrine to real-time CSLI because CSLI is unlike typical
records excepted from probable cause requirements under the doctrine. Law
enforcement that wishes to obtain real-time CSLI must now do so under a
warrant supported by probable cause. Not doing so will result in an unreasonable search, which risks exclusion at trial of any obtained evidence during
the search.
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